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Tobacco plays a very significant role in Malawi’s economy by being the largest
foreign exchange earner for the economy. The Integrated Production System was
implemented in 2012 to promote contract production and also improve quality of tobacco
which would therefore fetch higher prices for farmers. Contract farming has been
believed to be potentially beneficial, but many farmers still choose not to produce under
contract. This study examines factors that influence farmers’ tobacco contracting
decisions. 300 farmers were interviewed for the study using a structured questionnaire.
Data was analyzed with logit model using SAS software. Expected auction market price,
expected fertilizer cost for contract tobacco production, and the number of years farmers
have grown tobacco are negatively related to producers’ adoption of contract production.
Expected contract market prices, expected non-contract fertilizer cost, loan expectations,
number of years farmer has previously contracted and off-farm income are positively
related to contract adoption.
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INTRODUCTION

Malawi’s economy hugely depends on agriculture which represents about 39
percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 85 percent of the total labor force and
generates about 83 percent of the foreign exchange earnings (Chirwa et al. 2008).
Tobacco is an important crop as it contributes more than 70 percent of the total
agricultural exports. It also contributes close to 15 percent of the country’s GDP and
about 25 percent of the tax revenues. The tobacco sector provides income to about 20
percent of the country’s population (CIA 2013; Government of Malawi 2005, 2006a;
Jaffee 2003).
The institutional organization of the tobacco industry starts with the Ministry of
Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) which provides policy direction under the
Tobacco Act and the Control of Tobacco Auction Floors Act. The Ministry is responsible
for appointing members to the Board of Directors of the industry’s regulatory body, the
Tobacco Control Commission (TCC). Since the introduction of minimum prices, the
ministry is also responsible for setting the minimum price for each of the different
tobacco grades for each tobacco type.
The TCC is responsible for regulating and promoting the tobacco industry under
the Control of Tobacco Auction Floors Act. Its duties include regulating production,
manufacture and marketing of tobacco, advising the government on the sale and export of
1

tobacco, promoting and expanding the sale of tobacco, collecting statistics relating to
tobacco, carrying out market research, controlling and regulating the sale of tobacco,
licensing and registering tobacco growers and sellers, and lastly, defining tobacco grades
and classes for the purpose of selling and buying. All marketing services are provided by
Auction Holdings Limited (AHL) which is responsible for operating all the marketing
floors. There are selling floors located in each of the three regions of the country, with
the central region having two: Limbe auction floor in Blantyre, Southern Region;
Kanengo and Chinkhoma auction floors located in Lilongwe and Kasungu districts
respectively, in the Central Region; and Mzuzu auction floor located Mzuzu, in the
Northern Region. The floors are usually open from mid-March to late October.
There are two types of tobacco farmers in Malawi, estate farmers and smallholder
farmers. Estate farmers are composed of medium to large scale farmers who register and
are licensed as individuals while smallholders are organized into farmer clubs which are
affiliated to a farmer association. An association needs to have not less than 1500
registered growers or clubs (Tobacco Control Commission 2013). Some of the functions
of the associations are to help the farmers in transporting their tobacco to the selling
floors, provision of satellite depots and warehouses where the tobacco can be stored,
advocating for policy changes for the farmers and facilitating access to credit. To pay for
these services, the associations impose a levy on the gross sales of their registered
farmers. The two largest farmer associations are Tobacco Association of Malawi
(TAMA) and National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi, NASFAM (Chirwa
2011) but there are about eleven farmer associations that the Tobacco Control
Commission approves (Tobacco Control Commission 2014). The farmers and/or clubs
2

register for production with the TCC before each growing season and they are allocated a
quota for production, that is, the maximum number of kilograms each farmer/club can
produce for the season. According to the Tobacco Control Commission (2014), there are
a total of six buying companies in Malawi namely: Limbe Leaf, Alliance One, JTI Leaf,
Premium Tama, Malawi Leaf and Associated Tobacco Company (ATC).
The types of tobacco grown in Malawi are Burley, Flue-cured, Northern Division
Dark Fired (NDDF), Southern Division Dark Fired (SDDF), Oriental and Sun-air
(Chirwa 2011). However, the past decade has seen more of a concentration on Burley,
Flue-cured and NDDF, with Burley making up more than 90 percent of the total
production (Chirwa 2011).
Tobacco production, just like production of most crops in Malawi, follows the
rainy season that starts from November and lasts until around April. The seeds are first
sown in nurseries and later transplanted into the field. It is a labor intensive crop that also
requires a lot of chemicals to protect it from diseases and pests. Field activities such as
topping and sucker removal require a lot of labor. Tobacco requires more fertilizer than
most field crops. After the leaves mature, they are harvested in phases, starting from the
bottom leaves moving upwards. Different types of tobacco are cured differently. Burley
is hung in locally constructed barns with sticks and roofs thatched with grass while fluecured is cured in rooms equipped with pipes that are heated. Dark-fired types are cured
using smoke from wood fires. After curing, the tobacco is sorted into different grades
according to leaf position, length and quality and then usually tied in groups of 4 to 8
leaves, which are then put it bales made with hessian cloth, weighing not more than 120
kgs. The bales are then transported to the auction floor for sale.
3

Recently Malawian tobacco farmers have been complaining about relatively low
prices compared to tobacco prices in neighboring countries. Buyers have attributed the
lower prices to compromised demand for the country’s tobacco because of its relatively
poor quality. The poor quality has been attributed to farmers’ lack of adequate inputs.
In a move to ensure good quality tobacco leaf for international competition, to
manage production, and also to ensure traceability of the tobacco (an issue raised by
international tobacco buyers), the government in 2011 introduced the Integrated
Production System (IPS). The goal of the IPS is to achieve an 80% to 20% ratio of
contracted to non-contracted tobacco production in Malawi. Farmers under contract are
usually provided with loans to purchase improved inputs (seed, chemicals, and fertilizer)
and also benefit from the extension advisory services provided to them by their respective
contractors. Contracted farmers must sell their tobacco to the buyer with whom they have
contracted. Non-contracted farmers sell through the auction system. Table 1 indicates that
since 2008, contracted sales have often achieved higher average prices as compared to the
auction system.
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Table 1.1

2008-2013 Annual Average Prices

Year

Auction

Contract

2008

2.39

2.32

2009

1.79

1.78

2010

1.73

1.94

2011

1.12

1.15

2012

2.04

2.05

2013

1.95

2.05

Source: Tobacco Control Commission 2013, prices are in USD
The Tobacco Control Commission of Malawi (2012) reports that in the year 2012,
67 percent of the tobacco was sold under contract while 37 percent was sold on the
auction market. This leads to the question of why some farmers choose not to contract or
choose to contract only a limited portion of their expected production. What factors
influence these decisions? Since the effort to have this high percentage of tobacco
farmers under contract is new, and not much has been studied concerning tobacco
farmers in particular, this study is of great importance. Findings from this study will
provide stakeholders with information about farmer perceptions of the contracting
opportunities being promoted by the IPS.
1.1

Problem Statement
Malawi’s smallholder tobacco sector has been characterized by poor quality,

leading to low prices and low returns for tobacco farmers. The government approved and
implemented the IPS, a system encouraging contract farming, in an effort to improve
5

quality (and thus prices received) and increase productivity. However, in the first year of
the program’s implementation, the target for the percentage of contracted production was
not met.
1.2

Objectives
The main objective of this research was to determine the factors that influence

tobacco farmers’ decisions regarding how much of their expected production to contract.
Specifically, the research looked at the following:


Determining whether or not expectations regarding variability of yield
influences farmers’ contracting decisions.



Determining whether or not access to inputs/loans influences farmers’
contracting decisions.



Determining whether or not price expectations influence farmers’
contracting decisions.



Determining whether or not yield expectations influence farmers’
contracting decisions.



Determining whether or not previous contracting experience influences
farmers’ contracting decisions.

Determining whether or not some demographic factors influence farmers’ contracting
decisions.
1.3

The Auction Market System
The term auction market system refers to farmers producing tobacco on their own,

with their own resources, and selling the tobacco directly in the auction market. The
6

auction market is comprised of several buyers who compete by bidding for the tobacco at
the same time and the highest bidder gets the tobacco.
As of the 2012/13 and 2013/14 marketing seasons, the auction market had two
selling days and also two booking-for-delivery days per week, meaning that associations
that transport tobacco to the auction floors had two days per week in which they could
deliver the tobacco for the farmers. Each bale must have a tag with club name,
registration number and the lot number for that particular consignment. When the tobacco
has been delivered to the auction floor, it is stacked and assigned a date and a serial
number, which are communicated to the owners, for identification on sale. On that
particular selling day, the bales are organized according to their respective serial
numbers, with bales from the same consignment following each other. A few hands of
tobacco are sampled out of the bale and laid on top of the bale with a ticket that has all
the bale’s identification, in readiness for classification by Tobacco Control Commission
classifiers. These classifiers then classify each bale with respect to the leaf position on the
plant, quality and color of the tobacco, in readiness for the selling and buying team to do
their business. Each class is linked to a minimum price set by the government. The
selling and buying teams then come in, positioning themselves side by side of the tobacco
row, the selling team on one side, and the buying team on the other. The selling team
comprises a starter, an auctioneer, and a ticket marker, all officials from the Auction
Holdings Limited. The buying team comprises a buyer from each of the buying
companies. The sale starts by the starter shouting a starting price, usually the minimum
price of the class assigned to the tobacco in a particular bale, then the auctioneer does his
part while the buyers bid for the tobacco. Transactions on a bale last only a few seconds
7

and then they move to the next bale. The ticket marker puts the price at which the bale
has been sold and the company that has bought that particular bale on the ticket. Then
each company has its own classifiers who them classify their respective company’s bales
and also leaf checkers who come and check inside the bale to ensure that the tobacco
inside is consistent with that which was displayed on top, and that it is free from other
non-tobacco related materials. If they find any inconsistency, they open a case to be
arbitrated upon by arbitrators from the TCC. Cases can be opened due to mixtures in
quality, length, and also if the tobacco is taken to be too wet and not in good keeping
condition. Tobacco that is found to contain foreign material such as plastics, is returned
and sent to a commercial grader for rehandling. Finally, the arbitrator checks through all
the bales with cases and then decides upon seeing the validity of the case, whether to
return the bale for rehandling, reconditioning, or just re-offer, whereby the bale is just
taken back to AHL’s storage room to be assigned another day for sale. The proceeds of a
farmer’s sale are then processed and deposited to the farmer’s bank account within a few
days, usually three days.
1.4

Contract Marketing System
The contract or direct marketing system is where farmers agree to produce a

specified volume of tobacco with a specific buying company, either by being assisted
with an input loan or by themselves, and the tobacco is sold directly to that particular
company. However the delivery and sale of this tobacco is also managed through the
auction floors owned by AHL. According to The Gazette on Integrated Production
System Guidelines (2014), some of the minimum contract terms required are: the agreed
volume, commitments by the grower to sell and the tobacco buyer to buy the grower’s
8

entire contracted crop within an agreed production variance of 10%, and the agreed price
for each grade of tobacco, which shall be no less than the minimum price set and
published by the Tobacco Control Commission. Contracts are one year renewable and
according to the Gazette on Integrated Production System Guidelines (2014), failure to
comply with the above commitments is liable to penalty of MK50, 000 for tobacco
growers and MK500, 000 for tobacco buyers.
Tobacco buyers identify tobacco growers for contracts either on their own or
through grower associations and then sign the contract agreement before the farmer
registers for the season with the Tobacco Control Commission. The procedure from the
farmer to the selling floor is quite similar to that of the auction marketing system thus the
tobacco is sent through associations but in the contract marketing system, these
associations are also bound by the agreement with the buyer company. As of the 2012/13
and 2013/14 marketing seasons, contract tobacco was sold three days per week and
booking for delivery to the auction floors was also three days per week. Just like in the
auction system, once the tobacco reaches the auction floor, it is assigned a date of sale
and a serial number which are communicated to the owners. On the day of sale, the bales
are laid on the floor according to their serial numbers and tickets with identification
information are put on top of each bale. A few hands1 are sampled out of the bale and laid
on top of the bale and later classified by TCC classifiers. A buyer from the contracting
company then comes and purchases the tobacco, taking into account the grade assigned
by the classifier which also entails the minimum price below which he cannot buy. Once

1
A hand is a group of tobacco leaves tied together by the stalk, in terms of leaf position, length
and quality. These are then baled in hessian clothes.
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the buyer has bought the tobacco, there come classifiers from the company and then leaf
checkers to check for consistency of the quality of the bale and also check for some
foreign material such as plastics. Bales found with foreign material are returned for
rehandling. Those that are found to be inconsistent in quality are either sent for
rehandling if found to be in that state by TCC arbitrators, or sometimes the arbitrator
allows for the buyer to get the tobacco at a lower price, if the grower and the buyer agree
to do so. After sales, the proceeds are deposited into the farmer’s bank account after the
buying company had deducted its loan, if the farmer was under sponsored production.

10

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

History of tobacco production in Malawi
Before liberalization of the Malawian tobacco industry, tobacco farming was a

privilege to only estate farmers and tobacco marketing institutions were more adapted to
the needs of these estate farmers (Zanit 2012). The tobacco industry was liberalized in the
early 1990’s, allowing smallholder farmers to grow tobacco. During this time, a logistical
structure for tobacco transporting and marketing to address the needs of smallholder
farmers was put in place (Zanit 2012). Farmer clubs were introduced during this period.
A number of farmers between 10 and 30 sharing specific services such as extension
services and transportation, were allowed to form a farmer club and register with the
tobacco control commission where a quota was allocated to them. They were also entitled
to receive seed, fertilizer and extension services. From 1991/92, farmer clubs were given
authority to sell their tobacco directly at the auctions (Zanit 2012). This period saw the
transformation of the industry to one dominated by smallholder burley producers. Farmer
associations that already existed, together with some newly formed, helped with
collection, storage, transportation and sale of smallholder farmers’ tobacco.
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2.2

Contract Farming
Contract farming or contract production is an arrangement between a grower and

firm(s) with some conditions specified. They may either be marketing contracts or
production contracts (Little and Watts 1994). Eaton and Shepherd (2001) also define
Contract Farming (CF) as “an agreement between one or more farmers and a contractor
for the production and supply of agricultural products under forward agreements,
frequently at predetermined prices” (p. 2). In this agreement, the farmer commits to
provide a specified commodity in quantities and at quality standards determined by the
contractor, and the contractor also commits to support the farmer in the production of the
commodity through provision of inputs and technical advice, and to purchase the
commodity (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Usually, it is the contractor that initiates the
establishment of a CF scheme. These contractors want to improve quality of the products
supplied and also increase homogeneity in terms of quality on the products. Sometimes a
CF scheme can also be initiated by government to promote critical commodity chains or
by input suppliers who would like to expand input sales (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001).
Eaton and Shepherd (2001) explain 5 models of contract farming. The Centralized
Model is where the processor buys produce from a large number of small farmers. In this
model, there is strict control over quality and quantity is predetermined at the beginning
of the growing season. This model is usually used in products that require a very high
degree of processing. The Nucleus Model is slightly different from the centralized model.
In addition to sourcing the product from independent farmers, the contractor also has its
own production facilities such as an estate or plantation. The Multipartite Model is where
there is involvement of a number of organizations, usually including a statutory body.
12

This can develop through farmers organizing themselves into cooperatives, or there might
be involvement of a financial institution. The Informal Model is where individual
entrepreneurs or small companies contract informally with farmers on a seasonal basis.
Its success depends on the availability of support services such as research and extension
from the government. Finally, the Intermediary Model is where a processor formally
contracts with intermediaries who then informally contract with a number of small
farmers.
Bijman (2008) describes three types of contracts. First is the Market-specification
or marketing contract as “a pre-harvest agreement between producers and contractors on
the conditions governing the sale of the crop/animal. Besides time and location of sales,
these conditions include the quality of the product, thus affecting a few of the production
decisions of the farmer. The contractor reduces the producer’s uncertainty of locating a
market for the harvest. Under the market-specification contract the farmer maintains most
of the decision rights over his farming activities and thus his farm assets. Under this
contract the farmer bears most of the risk of his production activities” (p. 5). The second
type of contract is the Production-management contract which “gives more control to the
contractor than the market specification contract, as the contractor will inspect production
processes and specify input usage. Under this type of contract, producers agree to follow
precise production methods and input regimes. Under the production-management
contract, the farmer has delegated a substantial part of his decision rights over cultivation
and harvesting practices to the contractor; he is willing to do so because the contractor
takes on most of the market risks” (p. 5). Last is the Resource-providing contract,
whereby the contractor provides a market outlet and also inputs (in kind or credit). The
13

credit is recovered upon product delivery. The resource-providing contract is the most
prevalent for tobacco producers in Malawi.
2.2.1

Contract Farming in Malawi and Developing Countries
According to Prowse (2013), tobacco contracting in Malawi started in 2001-2002

when Stancom financed Press Agriculture to resume tobacco production on their estates.
Press Agriculture has stopped producing tobacco in the year 2000. Later in 2002-2003,
Limbe Leaf agreed with Press Agriculture to produce flue cured tobacco on 65 of their
estates. It received orders from the president not to buy the tobacco through auction
market but take it straight to its processing plant. However, it was alleged that these leaf
companies under-declared their tobacco and also smuggled tobacco out of the country to
avoid liabilities. For this reason, government made sure that starting from the 2003/2004
growing year, all tobacco that was financed by leaf companies should be sold through the
auction floors but not on the usual auction system. It was during this time that companies
such as Limbe Leaf and Dimon started contracting with smallholders. However, at that
time, other types of tobacco apart from burley were the ones being sold on contract.
Burley started to be bought on contract in 2007 (Limbe Leaf 2012).
Since the introduction of contract buying, there has been increasing pressures
from international cigarette manufacturers for sustainable, sponsored, contract tobacco
farming in Malawi. This is what led to the introduction of the IPS which would highlight
issues of quality compliance, traceability, and sustainable production, just to mention a
few (Limbe Leaf 2012). The IPS was approved and endorsed by the government and was
implemented in the 2012/2013 tobacco growing/marketing season.
14

The importance of contract farming in developing countries cannot be
overemphasized. Minot (1986) concluded that “contract farming is a successful means of
supplying credit, inputs, technology information and market information to growers
hence transferring production technology to the growers and also providing a more secure
market outlet” (p. 71). He further states that “in almost all cases for which data are
available, the implementation of contract farming schemes has resulted in significantly
higher incomes for participating growers and there is a long waiting list of growers
interested in participating” (p. 71). Barrett et al. (2012) state that contracting resolves
market failures in insurance markets by providing insurance against price risk, provision
of access to credit in financial markets; provision of access to inputs in input markets;
provision of information in producing high-return, non-traditional commodities and the
provision of agricultural extension services. They further state that “reduction in risk
provides smallholder farmers with incentives to increase production (Baron 1970;
Bellemare, Barrett and Just 2011) or to invest in yield-stabilizing technologies such as
irrigation or yield increasing inputs such as fertilizer or improved varieties (Liu 2010;
Michelson 2010)” (p. 719)2.
2.3

Why Farmers Enter Into Contracts
Some studies have been undertaken to understand what really motivates farmers

to enter into contracts and also take part in new technologies. Barrett et al. (2012) found
that small scale farmers use contracting to solve the market uncertainty problems that
they face. Masakure and Henson (2005) and Simmons (2002) found that small scale

2

The page is from the journal in which the paper was published, see citation for journal details.
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farmers also contract because they want to acquire indirect benefits such as training in
improved production practices. Abara and Singh (1993) point out that level of expected
benefits may also influence farmers to take part in new technologies. They state that
programs that produce significant gains can motivate people to participate in new
technologies and that without a significant difference in outcomes between two options
and in returns from alternative and conventional practices, it is less likely that small scale
farmers will adopt a new practice. Access to credit, sources of off-farm income, and
membership in an organization are also some of the factors that influence smallholder
farmers to enter contract farming (Masakure and Henson 2005; Barrett et al. 2012;
Sharma 2008).
Smallholder farmers usually cannot afford improved inputs and they usually do
not have access to credit from formal banks. Informal local lenders provide credit but
usually at very high interest rates. Contracts give farmers access to credit so they can
purchase improved inputs (Sharma 2008; Barrett et al. 2012; Simmons 2002). Sometimes
observations from other farmers who are already under contract and benefited from the
contract, will influence other farmers to enter into contracts because they also want the
benefits that their friends acquired (Barrett et al. 2012; Masakure and Henson 2005).
Socio-economic and demographic factors such as age of farmer, level of
education and farm size have also been found to be significant in explaining why farmers
enter into contracts. Sharma (2008) found that contract farmers were younger, more
educated, and had a larger farm size than non-contracted farmers. In his study looking at
adoption of fertilizer and hybrid seeds by smallholder farmers in southern Malawi,
Chirwa (2005) found that fertilizer adoption increased with the level of education, size of
16

the cultivated plot and level of non-farm income but decreased in female household
headship. On the other hand, adoption of hybrid seed decreased with age. In other studies,
such as Adesiina and Baidu-Forson (1995) and McNamara et al (1991), age has been
found to positively related to adoption while Shapiro and Brorsen (1988), Musser et al
(1996) and Sharma (2008) find age to be negatively related to adoption. Despite
education being found to positively affect adoption as in Sharma (2008), Daku (2002) ,
Doss and Morris (2001), it has also been found to negatively affect adoption such as in
Harper et al (1990) where higher education was negatively related to adoption of
Integrated Pest Management insect sweep nets in Texas.
2.4

Econometric models used in farmer adoption studies
Several models have been used to model farmer adoption decisions.

Smale et al. (1994) use the Heckman two step model in their study looking at land
allocation to hybrid maize seed varieties. They compare the difference between testing a
general land allocation model consisting of four nested models (competing explanations
for partial land allocation to new and traditional seed varieties), and testing the nested
models independently.
In examining farm characteristics that affect decisions to adopt marketing
contracts, Katchova and Miranda (2000) used the two step procedure. They considered
the quantity, frequency and contract type decisions conditional on the adoption decision
and not estimating the decisions independently. They estimate the discrete decision of
whether or not to adopt marketing contracts using a probit model and the other decisions
of quantity, frequency and contract type decisions using tobit, poisson and multinomial
logit models.
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Davis et al. (2005) also used the Heckman two step procedure in analyzing
forward pricing behavior of Indiana, Nebraska and Mississippi crop producers. They use
the model to evaluate the effect of various socio-economic variables on the decision to
forward price and the percentage of expected soybean and corn to be forward priced.
First, they estimate a probit model to determine the effect of dependent variables on the
probability of a respondent choosing to forward price soybean or corn prior to harvest.
They use linear regression models to explain the effect of independent variables on the
percentage of expected soybean or corn production that is forward priced. However,
unlike the general Heckman two-step procedure, these people use the Maximum
Likelihood estimation because the Heckman two-step procedure is consistent but not
efficient (Greene, 1997 p.984).
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The expected profit per hectare for a Malawian tobacco farmer is calculated as

E( )  {[ E(P) E(Y)]  cov(Y, P)}  E(C)

(3.1)

where 𝜋 is profit, 𝑃 is price, 𝑌 is yield, 𝐶 is cost per hectare, and 𝐸(⋅) is the expectations
operator. It is assumed that, a profit maximizing farmer will choose contracting or not
contracting based solely on expected profit

max  E (
NC ,C

NC

), E ( C ) 

(3.2)

where NC represents land allocation to non-contract production and C represents
contract tobacco production.
But contracting may also affect the variance of profit. If this is the case, a simple
profit maximizing model is no longer adequate to explain farmer decision-making.
Koundouri (2006) in his study of farmer technology adoption, contend that an expected
utility model is needed because technology adoption may influence both the expected
profit and the variability of profits. Similarly, tobacco farmers in Malawi may be
assumed to make contracting decisions according to the following objective function:

E U    , E U   
max
 
NC , C

NC
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(3.3)

where 𝑈 is utility,
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is expected utility for not contracting and

 

E U   C   E U




 P Y

C C

 C C ,  2 
C


(3.5)

is expected utility for contracting.
The utility function is assumed to be twice differentiable, increasing in 𝜋, and
decreasing in 𝜎𝜋2 . Equation 3 shows that differences in expected prices, differences in
expected yields, differences in expected costs of production or differences in risk
between contracted and non-contracted production could influence farmers’ contracting
decisions.
However, according to Smale et al. (1994), farmers in developing countries do not
fully adopt new technologies. They still allocate a portion of their land to traditional
varieties, which in this case can be likened to non-contract farming which has been the
farmers’ usual way of producing tobacco. They discuss some explanations for land
allocation to both new and traditional seed varieties and these explanations are: input
fixity, portfolio selection and farmer learning. Following this, farmers’ expected utility of
profit can be given as:





E U   C , NC    C E U  C    NC E U  NC 



(3.6)

where γc and γNC are the percentages of hectares devoted to contract and non-contract
production, respectively and the sum of γc and γNC is one.
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Tobacco farmers usually have their expectations on the prices on the two selling
systems, auction and contract (also called direct selling system). The price on the market
can be affected by several factors. First is supply for the tobacco. If there is oversupply,
prices are low, but farmers have more ability to negotiate for higher prices in the contract
market than they do on the auction floor. There is also some degree of direct involvement
by the farmers in the contract sale in that they can sometimes negotiate for a slightly
higher price on their tobacco if they feel it has not been awarded a price it deserves. After
the buyer has allocated a price to a particular bale, the farmer can appeal/negotiate for an
increase through their farmer representatives from their respective farmer associations.
Secondly, smallholder farmers usually do not have sufficient personal wealth to
purchase the improved inputs that would increase yields. Furthermore, they do not
usually have access to credit from banks to buy the inputs. Hence they may be attracted
to contracts because contracts may be a lower cost means of obtaining loans than going to
a bank or an informal lender.
The number of selling days for each market will also affect farmers’ decision
regarding contracting. With the IPS system, contract production has more offloading and
selling days than auction-sold production. For the auction tobacco, the stacked bales
usually accumulate into a large amount before it goes on the floor, and even on the
selling day, some of it has to be carried over to another day because of the limited space
and the required allocation to be sold per day. This increases the cost to farmers as they
usually incur additional travel and accommodation expenses if the selling date of their
tobacco has been shifted.
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The rejection rate is also another market factor that may influence contract
decisions. Bales are rejected when buyers choose not to pay the specified minimum price
for the grade of tobacco contained in the bale. This may be because the buyer believes the
bale has been incorrectly graded or for some reasons known to the buyers themselves.
Sometimes, the buyers have specific qualities that they prefer, according to the orders
from their clients, hence the other qualities face higher rates of rejection at that particular
time. Tobacco that has been rejected may experience quality losses over time resulting in
a lower realized price. The auction market generally has much higher rejection rates than
the contract market. Farmers may therefore, choose to contract to minimize the risk of
their tobacco facing several rejections before being bought. Rejection will also increase
costs to farmers because they have to commute to the selling floor for a number of times,
and sometimes even spend a number of nights waiting for their tobacco to be sold.
There are more steps taken to register for contract farming than non-contract
marketing. Apart from the process at the Tobacco Control Commission, those registering
for a contract will undergo further assessments by the company from whom they are
seeking a contract. This will increase farmers’ costs since they have to travel several
times to complete the registration process. These travels impose direct costs as well as
opportunity costs in the form of other activities left undone. Registration occurs at the
same time that farmers are preparing their fields through to nursery establishment.
Some farmers see the potential to acquire technical knowledge on the crop they
are growing and also a new crop, in contract farming (Masakure and Henson 2005;
Simmons 2002). This is because of the technical advice usually provided in most
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production contracts, and is also provided in tobacco contracts in Malawi. And this
knowledge might affect yield.
Observations from other farmers who are already under contract and benefited
from the contract, will also influence some farmers to go under contract because they also
want the benefits that their friends acquired (Barrett et al. 2012; Masakure and Henson
2005). Contracting, therefore, might increase their expectations on profit.
There are also some other factors that are not explained in the conceptual model
but may influence farmers’ decisions regarding contracting. Socio-economic and
demographic household characteristics have also been found to influence farmers’
decision regarding contracting. Among these are the age of the farmer, the farmer’s level
of education and farm size. Figure 3.1 below is a diagram of the conceptual framework of
the study.

Figure 3.1

Conceptual Framework
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND METHODS

4.1

Survey Design and Implementation
Before the survey was approved by the International Review Board (IRB) before

it was carried out (see appendix for details). The researcher and all that were directly
involved in it were certified by the board, as per requirement before handling human
subjects in research studies.
Primary data were used and were collected using a structured questionnaire. The
data were collected from three districts, Lilongwe, Kasungu and Dowa, from the central
region of Malawi. The central region is the largest tobacco producing region in Malawi.
Kasungu and Dowa are two of the largest tobacco producing districts in Malawi, they
together account for about 40 percent of the total tobacco production (Zanit 2012).
Lilongwe is also a major tobacco producing district.
A random sample of 100 farmers were interviewed from each district, thus a total
of 300 tobacco farmers were interviewed in-person using a questionnaire.
Data were collected in October and November of 2014. This time was chosen
because it is when farmers make contracting decisions. By this time most of the farmers
had already registered with the Tobacco Control Commission for their forthcoming
selling season, though some were still in the process of registration. This was also a
convenient time for data collection because farmers had not yet started preparing their
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nursery gardens for the tobacco and hence they were easily found in their homes. Had
they already started their nursery preparation, they would not be at home and it would
have been very difficult to interview a considerable number of respondents in a day.
4.1.1

Survey Questionnaire
The questionnaire had five sections. The first section comprised screening

questions meant to screen out respondents who had never produced tobacco and those
who had produced tobacco but were not the major decision maker in the household
regarding tobacco production. The section also had questions aimed at capturing the
respondent’s land holding size and the allocation to tobacco production, and also the
percentage of land allocated to contract farming from the total tobacco acreage.
The second section comprised questions about non-contracted tobacco
production. The questions captured the respondent’s expectations on yield, expectations
on input costs, price expectations and also expectations on market features such as
rejection rate, tobacco delivery and selling time.
The third section was for respondents who planned to produce some tobacco
under contract in the upcoming growing season. It had questions that captured the
respondent’s expectations on contract farming yield, input costs, prices and also
expectations on other market features.
For respondents who were not planning to produce any tobacco under contract in
the upcoming growing season the fourth section consisted of questions that were similar
to those in the third section in that they were designed to elicit these growers’ perceptions
of contract farming. The questions had to be worded a little differently than those in the
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third section because these growers were not intending to produce tobacco under
contract.
The last section had questions meant to capture household demographics, tobacco
farming experience, wealth, and contribution of tobacco to the household’s income.
4.1.2

Sampling
A sample of 100 farmers were randomly selected from each district, thus a total of

300 tobacco farmers were interviewed in-person using a questionnaire. All Extension
Planning Areas (EPAs) from each of the three districts were obtained from the Tobacco
Control Commission and two EPAs were randomly selected from each district.
Chitekwere and Nyanja EPAs were selected from Lilongwe district, Mponela and
Nambuma EPAs were selected from Dowa district and Santhe and Chipala EPAs were
selected from Kasungu district. Names of farmer clubs from each of the EPAs were
obtained and ten clubs were randomly selected from them. And finally, five farmers from
each club were randomly selected and interviewed using a questionnaire.
4.1.3

Questionnaire Administration
Before the actual administration of the questionnaire, the instrument was pre-

tested, with each interviewer conducting five interviews. The pre-test took place at the
Tobacco Control Commission office at Kanengo in Lilongwe whereby a few farmers
from those who come to register for the growing season were interviewed. The farmers
that agreed to help in this exercise were assisted with being prioritized in the registration
process.
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Having selected the farmers from each of the three districts, arrangements were
made with the government’s ministry of agriculture office in each of the three districts,
whereby an Agricultural Extension Development Coordinator (AEDEC) was contacted
and asked to help with mobilizing the selected farmers from his/her area and arranging
for a day when the farmers would come at a strategic venue where the interviews were
conducted. One venue from each EPA was selected. On the interview day, at a particular
venue, a group of thirty farmers were staggered at a one and half hour interval as they
would have to wait for a long time to get interviewed if they all came at once. Each
interviewer then chose a convenient spot, where no other third person would overhear the
conversation between him/her and the respondent. The interviews took on average, forty
minutes to complete and an average of thirty farmers were interviewed per day. After an
interview, the farmers were provided with some refreshments and snacks.
4.2

Descriptive Statistics
Tables 4.1 through 4.4 show some of the descriptive statistic findings, and the

actual questions from which the results were obtained can be viewed from the
questionnaire in the appendix section. The average age of the respondents was 40. This
varied a little by district with the average age of respondents in the Lilongwe, Dowa and
Kasungu Districts being 43, 38 and 40 respectively. The average landholding size for the
sample was 2.8 hectares and the average land area allocated to tobacco was 0.95 hectares,
with Lilongwe District having the lowest average area grown with tobacco. However,
despite Lilongwe tobacco farmers allocating relatively a smaller proportion of their land
to tobacco production, farmers in the district relatively allocate the highest proportion to
contract tobacco production.
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On average, 73 percent of total household income was from tobacco. Lilongwe
District had the lowest percentage income from tobacco and Dowa District had the
highest. This is likely because Lilongwe District contains a large urban area and thus has
more nearby opportunities for non-agricultural activities. This is also reflected in the fact
that respondents from Lilongwe District reporting having the highest average percentage
of income from non-agricultural sources among the three districts. Dowa is the least
developed among the three districts and also shows the lowest percentage average income
from non-agricultural sources.
The questionnaire results show that tobacco production is male dominated. Of
those who indicated that they were the primary decision maker in the household
regarding tobacco production, 99 percent were male. In terms of education, about 93
percent of the total sample attended at least primary school, with the majority, about 69
percent, having received only a primary school education.
As expected, the questionnaire results indicate that producers expect production
costs for seed, fertilizer and pesticides to be higher for contract production than for noncontract production. Likewise, the results also show higher expected yields for contract
production than for non-contract production. This might be because in contract farming,
the farmers are provided with the required inputs in the recommended quantities as
opposed to non-contract production where farmers buy their own inputs, and since most
farmers do not have the capacity to buy the inputs in the recommended quantities, they
expect to use less inputs per hectare. The higher expected yields in contract production is
likely due to the adequacy of inputs and also the technical assistance provided by the
contracting companies to their farmers.
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In terms of output market price expectations, it is also interesting to note that
expectations on all the prices (average, highest and lowest) were higher for the contract
market than the auction market. This is also consistent with results related to negotiation
ability. More than 80 percent of the sample believe that they will be able to negotiate for
a price increase at the contract market while more than 74 percent think they are less
likely to negotiate for a price increase at the auction market. The expectation on the
rejection rates per selling day is higher on the auction market, as expected, with the mean
expectation being 31 percent. Only 8 percent of the bales are expected to be rejected per
day on the contract market. This is also in line with the expectations on negotiation
ability, as in the contract market, growers sometimes agree to a price compromise so that
their bales (that were initially rejected by the contracting company buyer) should be
bought.
In describing how respondents have viewed their fellow farmers’ contracting
experience, 58 percent of the total sample viewed other farmers’ contracting experience
as at least positive while 19 percent viewed others’ contracting experience as at least
negative.
Contrary to expectations, the results indicate that the farmers expect to incur less
number of trips for contract registration than the non-contract registration.
On expectations on loans, the farmers are would expect to get a larger loan from
the bank as compared to what they would expect to borrow from informal money lenders.
The maximum they would expect to borrow from the bank is MK 238, 000 while they
would expect to borrow MK 66, 000 which is close to four times less the maximum bank
loan, from informal money lenders. Farmers expected to pay a lower interest rate on the
29

expected bank loan than on informal money lenders’ loans. The mean expected interest
rate on bank loan is 31 percent and that on informal lenders’ loans is 83 percent. The
mean expected interest rate on the contract loan is 41 percent.
Table 4.1 below shows summary statistics for continuous demographic variables.
Landholding size is the total land area for all crop production, tobacco area is the total
land area allocated to tobacco production while “% tobacco area” is the percentage of
land allocated to tobacco on total landholding size and was computed by responses from
question 4 by responses from question 2 in questionnaire (see appendix). “% contract
area” is the percentage of land allocated to contract tobacco production, on the total land
area allocated to tobacco production and was computed by dividing responses from
question 5 by responses from question 4 in questionnaire (see appendix). “% nonagricultural income” is the percentage of annual income from off-farm activities, on the
total estimated household annual income and was computed by dividing the responses
from question 54 by responses from question 53 in questionnaire (see appendix). “%
tobacco income” is the percentage of the income from that comes from tobacco proceeds,
on the total estimated annual household income and was computed by dividing the
responses from question 55 by responses from question 53 in the questionnaire (see
appendix).
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Table 4.1

Summary statistics for continuous demographic variables

VARIABLE TOTAL
LILONGWE
(N=300)
(n=100)
Mean
Mean
Age
40.52 (13.27)
43.34 (13.05)
Household 6 (2.71)
6 (2.15)
Size
Landholding 2.83 (2.57)
1.70 (0.98)
Size (Ha.)
Tobacco
0.95 (0.86)
0.45 (0.30)
Area (Ha.)
% Non22.00 (19.59)
26.02 (21.12)
Agricultural
income
% Tobacco 73.27 (59.90)
63.73 (20.77)
Income
% Tobacco 35.26 (15.40)
29.05 (14.16)
Area
% Contract 46.69 (48.40)
63.40 (46.62)
Area
In parentheses are standard deviations

DOWA(n=100) KASUNGU
(n=100)
Mean
Mean
37.69 (11.70)
40.52 (14.44)
6 (2.40)
7 (3.39)
3.29 (2.35)

3.50 (3.39)

1.18 (0.82)

1.21 (1.04)

19.10 (19.51)

20.89 (17.53)

84.02 (82.72)

71.96 (17.71)

38.36 (14.19)

38.38 (15.99)

38.12 (46.82)

38.38 (47.76)

Table 4.2 below shows summary statistics for non-continuous demographic
variables. None, primary, JC, MSCE and tertiary are categories of education level
representing respondents that did not attend school, reached up to primary school level,
reached up to junior secondary school level, reached up to senior secondary school level,
and reached up to tertiary education level, respectively. “%yes” refers to the percentage
of respondents that agreed to possessing the specified (wealth measure) item. 48 percent
of the tobacco farmers possess at least an iron-roofed house, 92 percent possess at least a
bicycle, 80 percent possess at least a cellphone, 28 percent possess at least an ox-cart, 15
percent possess at least a motorcycle and 15 percent possess at least a television set.
These statistics do complement the view that tobacco farming does improve the wealth
and status of farmers.
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Table 4.2

Summary statistics for non-continuous demographic variables

VARIABLE
Gender (%)

TOTAL LILONGWE DOWA
KASUNGU
99
98.0
100
99.0
1.0
2.0
0.0
1.0
Education level (%)
7.0
11.1
3.0
7.0
69.0
77.8
72.0
59.0
14.0
5.0
14.0
22.0
9.0
6.1
11.0
10.0
0.7
0.0
0.0
2.0
Iron roof house (%yes)
48.0
58.6
40.0
47.0
Car (%yes)
3.0
1.0
7.0
1.0
Oxcart (%yes)
28.0
24.2
24.0
35.0
Motorcycle (%yes)
15.0
6.1
21.0
19.0
Bicycle (%yes)
92.0
94.9
88.0
92.0
TV set (%yes)
15.0
15.1
16.0
14.0
Cellphone (%yes)
80.0
69.7
84.0
85.0
“%yes” refers to the percentage of respondents that agreed to possessing the specified
(wealth measure) item.
Male
Female
None
Primary
JC
MSCE
Tertiary
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Table 4.3

Summary Statistics for Yield, Price and Cost Expectations

VARIABLE
Auction price (USD)
Highest auction price (USD)
Lowest auction price (USD)
Contract price (USD)
Highest contract price (USD)
Lowest contract price (USD)
Non-contract seed cost/ha (MK)

TOTAL
LILONGWE
2.04 (0.49) 2.11 (0.56)
2.55 (0.48) 2.55 (0.46)
1.39 (0.53) 1.48 (0.53)
2.31 (0.59) 2.47 (0.74)
2.77 (0.62) 2.86 (0.89)
1.76 (0.65) 1.94 (0.78)
4890
5894 (8412.97)
(7441.77)
Non-contract fertilizer cost/ha
167864
187824
(MK)
(90342.48) (102583.18)
Non-contract pesticide cost/ha
16005
22107
(MK)
(23276.43) (32142.06)
Non-contract yield/ha (Kgs)
1769 (854.86) 1877 (932.06)
Non-contract highest yield/ha
2313
2619 (2542.82)
(Kgs)
(1696.31)
Non-contract lowest yield/ha (Kgs) 1249 (652.33) 1280 (676.37)
Contract seed cost/ha (MK)
46597
56544
(144453.71) (190044.81)
Contract fertilizer cost/ha (MK)
245952
279667
(150884.53) (154998.75)
Contract pesticide cost/ha (MK)
31942
47310
(44886.75) (60811.62)
Contract yield/ha (Kgs)
2288(1134.61 2670 (1303.42)
)
Contract maximum yield/ha (Kgs) 2739
3210 (1577.94)
(1410.92)
Contract lowest yield/ha (Kgs)
1676 (869.42) 1891 (1014.85)
Contract seed cost for non-contract 15549
25878
farmers (MK)
(53949.47) (93181.91)
Contract fertilizer cost for non259058
267006
contract farmers (MK)
(132015.56) (133420.66)
Contract pesticide cost for non27234
31083
contract farmers (MK)
(24791.94) (31221.73)
Contract yield/ha for non-contract 2487 (997.09) 2585 (984.25)
farmers (Kgs)
Contract highest yield/ha for non- 3108
3116 (1076.53)
contract farmers (Kgs)
(2393.19)
Contract lowest yield/ha for non- 1799 (834.62) 1841 (839.04)
contract farmers (Kgs)

In parentheses are standard deviations
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DOWA
KASUNGU
1.94 (0.43)
2.07 (0.52)
2.52 (0.44)
2.59 (0.53)
1.25 (0.47)
1.45 (0.58)
2.16 (0.47)
2.31 (0.49)
2.71 (0.37)
2.76 (0.47)
1.52 (0.47)
1.82 (0.59)
4545
4242 (7180.95)
(6596.73)
149423
166545
(82407.95)
(81338.61)
10866
15470
(12732.51)
(20679.80)
1623 (779.79) 1810 (834.70)
2065 (945.41) 2259 (1099.44)
1154 (636.90) 1315 (638.65)
22589
51912
(68753.79)
(103916.09)
217685
210140
(161970.61) (108080.25)
18057
23199
(21989.16)
(20188.42)
1883(924.26) 2028(754.05)
2252
2406 (862.94)
(1308.81)
1404 (724.59) 1577 (614.88)
9076
16787
(6721.64)
(53831.07)
256703
257577
(129995.81) (135474.15)
21449
30708
(16481.11)
(27024.02)
2353 (991.59) 2570 (1010.02)
3249
2965 (1137.69)
(3559.23)
1680 (881.82) 1896 (781.98)

Table 4.4

Summary statistics for other variables

VARIABLE
TOTAL
Expected maximum bank loan
238043
(MK)
(358299.30)
Expected bank loan interest rate 30.7(22.43)
(%)
Expected maximum informal
65971
lender loan (MK)
(74800.96)
Expected informal lender loan
83.2(40.49)
interest rate (%)
Expected auction rejection rate 31 (22.86)
(%)
Expected contract interest rate
41.1 (47.16)
(%)
Expected contract rejection rate 7.8 (41.44)
(%)
Trips to register auction (trips)
3
Trips to register contract (trips) 2 (1.77)
Cost per trip to registration (MK) 4077.5
Years growing tobacco (years) 10 (8.55)
Negotiation ability auction
Somewhat likely 18.1
Very likely
8.7
Unlikely
54.5
Very unlikely
18.7
Negotiation ability contract
Somewhat likely 38.5
Very likely
42.6
Unlikely
13.8
Very unlikely
5.1
Others experience in contract
Negative
14.7
Neutral
19.7
No knowledge
3.0
Positive
21.4
Very negative
3.7
Very positive
37.5
In parentheses are standard deviations

LILONGWE DOWA
89625
326324
(72621.61) (356865.84)
26.9(24.81) 38.7(23.36)

KASUNGU
358593
(515831.98)
29.7(13.83)

43362
(55331.19)
67.3(33.85)

80660
73861
(89184.54) (68288.11)
90.0(40.97) 93.5(42.44)

20 (17.86)

38 (21.97)

35 (24.44)

40.9 (55.82) 37.7 (19.50) 56.0 (62.22)
4.7 (6.4)

12.7 (70.57) 6.0 (7.87)

4
2 (1.44)
4497.7
7 (5.15)

3
1 (0.99)
2952.5
12 (9.55)

4
2 (1.30)
4833.0
12 (9.20)

23.2
11.1
45.4
20.2

14.0
10.0
58.0
18.0

17.0
5.0
60.0
18.0

26.8
41.2
22.7
9.3

47.0
42.0
10.0
1.0

41.4
44.4
9.1
5.0

22.2
12.1
8.1
18.2
7.1
32.3

9.0
24.0
0.0
22.0
1.0
44.0

13.0
23.0
1.0
24.0
3.0
36.0

A simple net return expectation (tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8) for each farmer was
calculated using the following formula:
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 i  Pi *Yi  SCi  FCi  PCi  tripsi *cos t / trip 

(4.1)

where  i is expected net return for each production system. Pi and Yi are expected price
and expected per hectare yields respectively, for each production system. For these
variables, farmers were asked to state their highest, median and lowest expectations from
which the mean was calculated. SCi , FCi and PCi are expected per hectare seed costs,
fertilizer costs, and pesticide costs respectively for each production system. tripsi and

cos t / trip are expected number of trips to complete the registration process and expected
estimated cost per each trip, respectively for each production method. For tables 4.5 and
4.6, all farmers, those that intended to contract and those that did not intend to contract,
were asked to state their expectations on non-contract production. They all were asked to
state their expectations if they produced non-contracted tobacco on the plot they allocated
to tobacco production (see questions 7-22 in questionnaire). For table 4.8, farmers that
did not intend to contract were asked to state their expectations such as highest, median
and lowest price and yield expectations for contract production (questions 30-43). The
results show that the mean net return expectations are higher for contract tobacco
production than for non-contract production. Interestingly, even those respondents who
stated that they did not intend to produce contracted tobacco in the upcoming growing
season had higher net return expectations for contract production, and very much
interesting, is that they even had higher net return expectation for contract production
than those who intended to produce under contract (tables 4.7 and 4.8). Clearly this
shows that these farmers are not driven by net return expectations in their contracting
decisions. Perhaps these farmers are concerned about their financial risk in that they
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would still be required to repay the input loan from contracting companies in case some
unforeseen factor such as drought occurs and they have little proceeds from tobacco.
They may also be concerned about the production risk of growing a new tobacco seed
varieties which need more attention than the traditional varieties which they are used to.
This might also lead to them producing inferior quality tobacco and probably low yields
hence also leading to the financial risk described above. Maybe these farmers just don’t
trust the contracting companies or the legal system, in case they end up with a case
against the contracting companies. Maybe they have no previous experience with any
kind of contract so they are afraid of what might be contained in the “small print” of a
contract. It might as well be that these farmers have seen a fellow farmer who had
contracted encounter a negative experience and they are afraid that they would encounter
a similar experience. In short, if these farmers are risk averse, they may just be more
inclined to stick to the auction system which they know and understand better.
Table 4.5

Expected net return matrix for non-contract tobacco production for
respondents who did not intend to produce contracted tobacco
Output price

Yield

HIGH

MEDIUM

LOW

HIGH

2,289,661

1,797,116

1,205,101

MEDIUM

1,658,111

1,271,367

830,464

LOW

1,136,375

864,835

549,570

Figures are in Malawi Kwacha (MK) where MK 400 = 1 USD
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Table 4.6

Expected net return matrix for non-contract tobacco production for
respondents who intended to produce contracted tobacco
Output price

Yield

HIGH

MEDIUM

LOW

HIGH

2,068,914

2,617,751

982,783

MEDIUM

1,615,340

2,123,838

746,667

LOW

1,029,584

1,583,478

448,104

Figures are in Malawi Kwacha (MK) where MK 400 = 1 USD
Table 4.7

Expected net return matrix for contract tobacco production for respondents
who intended to produce contracted tobacco
Output price

Yield

HIGH

MEDIUM

LOW

HIGH

2,645,386

2,241,888

1,522,834

MEDIUM

2,137,955

1,798,264

1,209,110

LOW

1,463,358

1,224,167

800,853

Figures are in Malawi Kwacha (MK) where MK 400 = 1 USD
Table 4.8

Expected net return matrix for contract tobacco production for respondents
who did not intend to produce contracted tobacco
Output price

Yield

HIGH

MEDIUM

LOW

HIGH

3,246,847

2,628,482

1,872,613

MEDIUM

2,476,664

1,979,489

1,369,067

LOW

1,766,192

1,396,286

949,613

Figures are in Malawi Kwacha (MK) where MK 400 = 1 USD
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4.3

Econometric Estimation

4.3.1

Estimating Equations
Data were analyzed using SAS and Stata software. The logit methods was used to

estimate one equation. The equation estimates the percentage of land allocated to contract
production which can be given as:

 P 
ln  i   1   2 X i  ui
 1  Pi 

(4.2)

where Pi  Pr Yi  Yes / X i  is probability of choosing to contract, Yi  Yes / X i  and

X i is a vector of explanatory variables. A linear mean-variance approach is used rather
than an explicit utility function form. Farmers’ objectives can be expressed in terms of
their yield expectations and perceptions of relative yield variance (Smale et al., 1994).
The expected value of per hectare profit from tobacco production is per hectare
total revenue less total costs which include fertilizer cost (the primary cost), seed cost,
and cost of trips to registration.
Unlike in Smale et al. (1994) where output price ratio was used, prices were
treated separately because even though the official government minimum prices are the
same, differences in expected prices were observed between auction and contract market
farmers.
Contracting experience is expressed by a variable that measures how many years
the farmer had contracted at least some of their land, apart from the current growing
season. This measures the influence of learning by doing on allocation of land to contract
tobacco production (Smale et al., 1994).
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Table 4.9

Measured Variables

Dependent Variable

Description

P_c
Explanatory Variables

Probability of contracting
Description

Price_contract

Expected price per kg contract tobacco (USD)

Price_auction

Expected price per kg non-contract tobacco (USD)

Contfertperha

Expected fertilizer cost for contract production

noncontfertperha

Expected fertilizer cost for non-contract production

yield_contract

Expected yield contract production

newyield_nc

Expected yield non-contract

var_ratio

Ratio of variances computed from yield distributions

years_tobacco_pdctn

Number of years the farmer has previously contracted

years_prev_grwn

Number of years the farmer has been producing tobacco

expctd_rejctnrate_au

Expected daily contract market tobacco rejection rate

Income_fromnonagrics

Estimated annual income from non-agricultural sources

Education level
(4 dummies)

The highest level of education reached by farmer

Negotiatn_ability_auction
(4 dummies)

Likelihood of negotiating for a price increase on auction

Negotiatn_likelihood_contct
(4 dummies)

Likelihood of negotiating for a price increase on contract

4.3.2

Variable Measurement
Table 4.8 above shows the empirical measures for the variables defined in the

above section. The binary Yes/No dependent variable was derived from the
transformation of the percentage land allocated to contract tobacco production variable,
which was computed from measured areas for contract tobacco and that of all tobacco.
Expected output prices were elicited from farmers when they had just started the
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production process. Expected fertilizer costs were used because they are the main cost in
the tobacco production and were elicited from farmers. The variable years_prev_grwn is
the number of years the farmer has contracted at least some of their tobacco, not
including the survey season, as reported by farmers and the variable years_tobacco_pdctn
is the total number of years the farmer has been producing tobacco. These were elicited
from farmers.
Expected yields and yield variances were computed from farmers’ expected yields
which were elicited as a set of triangular yield distributions. Just as in Smale et al. (1994),
farmers were asked to state the minimum, maximum and modal yield they expected to
obtain from a given plot for each production system. Yield was computed by dividing the
output estimates by area of the plot.
The expected rejection rates per selling day, “expctd_rejctn_contra” and
“expctd_rejctnrate_au” were elicited from farmers as number of bales they expected not
to be sold per a hundred-bale row. Estimated total annual incomes, income from nonagricultural sources, landholding size, age, and education level were elicited from
farmers.
4.3.3

Estimation Procedure
There is one equation estimated. The equation concerns the percentage of land

allocated to contract production and is estimated using logit regression. Since the results
showed that there was a very small number of observations that had allocated between
zero and hundred percent to contract, thus, a huge majority of the observations either
contracted all or not any of their land. The dependent variable “percent contract” was
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transformed to a 0, 1 only variable, thus all observations less than 0.5 were classified as 0
and those greater than 0.5 were classified as 1.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS

5.1

Land allocation to contract tobacco production
From the analysis of factors influencing the probability of contracting, table 5.1,

the Hosmer and Lemeshow test shows that the model correctly predicts the variations in
the responses and twelve variables were found to be significant at, at least, 10 percent
significance level. The results are summarized in table 5.2. As anticipated, expected
auction price (price_auction) is found to be negatively related to adoption of tobacco
contract production, thus, increases in the expected auction market price reduces the
likelihood of adoption of tobacco contract farming. Expected contract market price is
found to be positively related to adoption of contract tobacco production, just as
anticipated. Thus, an increase in the expected contract market price also increases the
likelihood of adoption of tobacco contract farming. Expected contract production
fertilizer cost (contfertperha) and expected non-contract production fertilizer cost
(noncontfertperha) were found to negatively and positively affect adoption of contract
tobacco production, respectively. Expectation of ability to take a loan from an informal
money lender (inflender_nc) was found to positively affect adoption of tobacco contract
farming. Thus farmers that expected to be able to take a loan from an informal money
lender were more likely to adopt a tobacco farming contract than those that did not expect
to be able to take a loan from the mentioned source. This finding is contrary to what was
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expected. It was thought that some farmers were contracting because they could not get a
loan to purchase inputs, but it seems this is not the case. This could be that those that
expected to take informal lender loans were not afraid to take loans hence also more
likely to contract to obtain the input loans. Expected tobacco rejection rate per auction
market selling day (expctd_rejctnrate_au) was also significant. However, the sign of its
parameter estimate was not as anticipated as it was found to be negatively related to
adoption of a tobacco contract, meaning that an increase in the expected rejection rate for
the auction market decreases the likelihood of a farmer taking a tobacco farming contract.
Perhaps this can be that these farmers have high hopes of the tobacco selling at a better
price the next time it comes back on the market after it was initially rejected. Since the
farmers do not have the chance for negotiations on the auction market, and in negotiating
they sometimes compromise on price in cases where their tobacco was found to be faulty
in terms of presentation in the bale3, these farmers probably do not want to compromise
on the selling price. Two dummies for expectation on negotiation ability in the auction
market were found to be significant. A dummy for those that thought it somewhat likely
that they would be able to negotiate for a price increase and those that thought it unlikely
that they would be able to negotiate for a price increase in the auction market were found
to be less likely to adopt contracting. Very unlikely to be able to negotiate for a price
increase was the reference, which means that those that thought it somewhat likely that
they would be able to negotiate for a price increase in the auction market are less likely to
take a tobacco production contract than those who thought it very unlikely that they

3
Faulty presentation is such as bad mixtures in quality, length and leaf positions, which are
outside the accepted standards for bale presentation. Bales with bad mixtures are returned for re-handling.
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would be able to negotiate for a price increase in the auction market. Likewise, those that
thought it unlikely that they would be able to negotiate for a price increase in the auction
market are less likely to take a tobacco production contract than those that thought it very
unlikely to negotiate.
On the demographic variables, experience in contract tobacco production
(years_prev_grwn), experience in tobacco production (years_tobacco_pdctn), income
from non-agricultural sources (income_fromnonagrics) and a dummy for those that
reached junior certificate level of education (JC) were significant at 10 percent. Number
of years the farmer had contracted before was found to be positively related to contract
adoption, thus as the number of years of contract production increased, the likelihood of
the farmer contracting also increased. However, number of years in tobacco production
was found to be negatively related to adoption thus, as the number of years in tobacco
production increased, the likelihood of the farmer contracting decreased. Estimated
annual income from non-agricultural sources (income_fromnonagrics) was found to
positively affect contracting, thus those that had higher income from non-agricultural
sources were also more likely to contract. And lastly, a dummy for those that reached
junior certificate level of education was found to be negative, meaning that those that had
this level of education were less likely to contract as compared to those that had reached
primary school education (prim) which was the reference category.
5.2

Other findings
Apart from the findings from econometric estimation, other observations were

made in the course of survey interviews.
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It was found that farmers do not know the actual monetary value of their input
loans they obtain from contracting companies, the price at which they were given the
inputs, and also the actual interest rates on the loans. These issues are not specified in the
contract agreement document.
Table 5.1

Maximum Likelihood estimates for contract adoption equation

Variable

Estimate

Std error

Wald

P-value

Marginal effect

Intercept
price_auction
price_contract
noncontract fertilizer cost
contract fertilizer cost
yield non-contract
yield_contract
informal lender loan
contracting experience
years_tobacco_pdctn
yield variance ratio
off-farm income
no education
Junior secondary school
MSCE
Tertiary education level
auction rejection rate
V. likely to negotiate_auc
somewhat likely_auction
unlikely to negotiate_auct
somewhat likely_contract
unlikely to negotiat_cont
very unlikely_contract

2.2299
-1.8624
1.0700
9.771E-6
-3.63E-6
-0.0443
-0.00113
0.7062
0.6571
-0.0463
-0.0407
1.818E-6
-0.4406
-0.9269
-0.3356
-17.8412
-2.2960
-0.6411
-1.0774
-1.6085
-0.1623
0.5290
0.4169

1.1732
0.5086
0.4428
3.089E-6
1.711E-6
0.0387
0.0286
0.3315
0.1242
0.0194
0.0505
1.025E-6
0.6672
0.5295
0.5781
1227.4
0.8371
0.6886
0.5609
0.4606
0.3708
0.5421
0.7650

3.6127
13.4073
5.8398
10.0040
4.5067
1.3117
0.0016
4.5390
27.9802
5.6686
0.6486
3.1456
0.4362
3.0643
0.3369
0.0002
7.5236
0.8667
3.6894
12.1946
0.1915
0.9522
0.2970

0.0573
0.0003
0.0157
0.0016
0.0338
0.2521
0.9685
0.0331
<.0001
0.0173
0.4206
0.0761
0.5090
0.0800
0.5616
0.9884
0.0061
0.3519
0.0548
0.0005
0.6617
0.3292
0.5858

0.3142511***
0.1805509**
1.6487223E-6***
-6.128073E-7*
-0.0074794
-0.000190756
0.1191556*
0.1108826***
-0.0078081**
-0.0068639
3.0675441E-7*
-0.0743496
-0.1563994*
-0.0566187
-3.0103986
-0.3874067***
-0.1081720
-0.1818003*
-0.2714009***
-0.0273785
0.0892589
0.0703409

Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test
Chi-square
DF
Pr>Chi-square
5.7320
8
0.6772
Other tests
Criterion
Intercept only Intercept and covariates
AIC
339.361
294.415
SC
342.866
378.543
-2 Log Likelihood
337.361
246.415
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
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Table 5.2

Summary of significant variables, their effect/relationship on contract
adoption

Variable

Anticipated
sign

Effect/relationship

Expected contract price
Expected auction price
Expected contract fertilizer cost
Expected non-contract fertilizer cost
Expectation on informal lender loan
Previous contracting experience
Tobacco farming experience
Off-farm income
Junior secondary school (primary sch.-ref.
category)
Expected auction market rejection rate
Somewhat likely to negotiate for price on auction
(very unlikely-ref. category)
Unlikely to negotiate for price on auction (very
unlikely-reference category)

+
+
+/+/+/-

+
+
+
+
+

+/+

-

-

-

-

-
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Tobacco is the major foreign exchange earner in Malawi and is important in
various aspects, including improving the social standards of people in Malawi through
the employment it provides to many. The (burley) tobacco farming community has been
characterized by smallholder farming since the industry was liberalized in the early 90’s.
This has seen Malawi’s tobacco being described of being of poor quality, which also
affects the prices offered at the market hence also affecting farmers’ profits. The
government introduced the Integrated Production system, which also aims at increasing
the contractual production of the crop and basically refocusing the industry towards the
contract production system. This, however found some challenges to be achieved in the
first year(s) of implementation. The study was aimed at determining factors that influence
smallholder tobacco farmers’ decisions regarding contracting.
The study used primary data which were collected using a questionnaire and
analyzed using SAS and Stata softwares by producing descriptive statistics and running a
logistic regression.
6.1

Summary of findings
Empirical results show that tobacco farming in Malawi is male dominated in

terms of crucial decision making regarding tobacco farming, with more than 97 percent
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of the crucial decision makers being male. These farmers allocate less than 40 percent of
their landholding size to tobacco production. It has also been found that tobacco farming
contributes a significant part on tobacco farmers’ income and social status. More than 70
percent of their total annual income comes from tobacco.
The study has found some factors that influence the farmers’ decisions regarding
contracting. On factors from theory, expected prices and expected cost have been found
to influence the farmers’ decision to contract, while expected yields and yield variance do
not influence tobacco contracting decision. Expectation on availability of loans from
informal lenders, experience in contracting, experience in tobacco farming, income from
non-agricultural sources, a dummy for education level and a dummy for negotiation
ability, all influence contracting decision differently. Age, household income and
observation from other farmers, which in some studies have been found to affect
contracting decision, do not influence tobacco contracting decision. This finding also
agrees with the findings of Ilembo et al4 who found age and household income not to
affect adoption of input credit in tobacco contracts.
6.1.1

Other observations
One interesting finding from the study is that contrary to Smale et al. (1994) who

stated that farmers in developing countries do not allocate all their land to contract
production, tobacco farmers either contract all their land allocated to tobacco, or do not at
all, allocate their land allocated to tobacco production to contract farming.

4

The paper does not provide the year of publication.
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Apart from the findings from the econometric analyses, it was also found that
most farmers that had prior contracting experience do not know the amount of loan they
get from the companies in monetary value, they do not know the prices at which they
were given the inputs, and also the interest rate on the loan.
It was also observed that the contract itself does not include the prices at which
the specific grades of tobacco will be bought at, apart from the government set minimum
prices.
6.2

Policy implications
The findings from the study provides stakeholders with relevant information on

how they can achieve their goal of re-defining the Malawi tobacco industry into a
contract production based industry, through the newly introduced Integrated Production
System (IPS). It provides information on what tobacco farmers take into consideration
when making tobacco production contracting decisions.
Farmer expectations on the contract market are very good, and even the simple
profits calculated from the elicited data showed higher expected profits from the contract
production but there is still something that the government and the contracting companies
should do to achieve the above stated goal. The government, through the ministry of
agriculture and the tobacco control commission could look into the prices that they set in
terms of the marketing season’s minimum prices since a farmer is likely to take a contract
if they are expecting a higher price in the contract market. Tobacco buyers could also
take this and use it to their advantage by providing much more on top of the government
set minimum prices in the contract market. Output prices should also be clearly stated in
the contract documents. Perhaps, specification of something such as a percentage
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addition on top of the government set minimum prices for each tobacco class would make
the farmers be assured of the higher price they expect from the contract market.
The contracting companies could also try to provide the inputs at a lower prices,
relative to non-contract fertilizer prices. Or perhaps the government should also help by
providing subsidies to fertilizer for contract tobacco production, or under proper review
and consultations, extend the Fertilizer Input Subsidy Program (FISP) to tobacco and
restrict it to contract production if applied to tobacco. In addition, fertilizer prices, and
interest rate at which they provide the inputs should be clearly stated to the farmers in the
contract.
Another implication from the study is that over time, as more growers get
experienced in contract production, the proportion of contracted production should
increase. This is due to the fact that previous contracting experience was positively
related to the probability of contracting next year.
6.3

Study limitations and areas for further research
This study only concentrated on adoption of contract farming in a more general

view, and also a contract in a similar view. Other researchers could possibly add to it how
adoption differs among contracting companies. Other decision variables such as fertilizer
application rates might also be considered in estimation, and not only percentage of land
allocated to contract production as in this study.
The study also used expected prices, expected yields and expected fertilizer costs
were used on their absolute levels. It is recommended that for future research, these
variables should be treated as a ratio of contracted to non-contracted production, as what
drives contract adoption is the ratio of these variables and not their absolute levels.
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Trust issues are also very important in contract agreements. The study did not
capture any data on farmer trust on the contractor.
The study also just looked at the supply side of contracting. Future research might
want to talk to tobacco buyers to better understand factors that drive the demand for
contracted tobacco relative to non-contracted tobacco. Others have also looked at
contracting as principal-agent game. This study did not take the adoption concept as a
game, however, with the budding of economic experiments in social research, other
researchers could probably look into the tobacco contract adoption through economic
experimentation.
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ENGLISH VERSION OF QUESTIONNAIRE
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Questionnaire
1. Are you the person in your household who generally makes decisions about
selling tobacco? Yes

No

a. If yes, continue. If no, terminate questionnaire.
2. How many acres of land do you expect to have in crop production (for all crops)
during the upcoming growing season? ________Acres
3. Do you intend to produce tobacco during the upcoming growing season? Yes
No
a. If yes, continue. If no, terminate questionnaire.
4. How many acres of land do you expect to allocate to tobacco production during
the upcoming growing season? ________ Acres (must be less than or equal to
the response to question 2).
5. How many acres of land do you expect to allocate to contracted tobacco
production during the upcoming growing season? ________ Acres (must be less
than or equal to the response to question 4).
a. If the answer to question 4 is not equal to the answer to question 3 (i.e., the
respondent intends to have some non-contracted production), proceed to
question 6.
b. Have you ever previously engaged in non-contracted tobacco production
(production that will be sold in the auction market)? Yes

No

i. If the answer to 5.b is “No”, then terminate questionnaire.
6. In how many previous growing seasons (not including the upcoming growing
season) have you contracted at least some of your tobacco production?
________ Seasons
a. If the answer to question 6 is zero, proceed to question 7.
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b. With how many different companies have you entered into tobacco
production contracts? ________ Companies
NON-CONTRACTED

TOBACCO

PRODUCTION

SOLD

THROUGH

AUCTION
7. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to noncontracted tobacco production, how much would you expect to spend on
tobacco seed?

MK ___________

8. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to noncontracted tobacco production, how much would you expect to spend on
fertilizers applied to the tobacco crop? MK ___________
9. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to noncontracted tobacco production, how much would you expect to spend on
pesticides applied to the tobacco crop? MK ___________
10. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to noncontracted tobacco production, would you expect to be able to take out a loan
from a bank (or other formal lender such as a microfinance institution) to cover
at least part of the input cost? Yes

No

a. If no, proceed to question 11. If yes,
i. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated
to non-contracted tobacco production, what would you expect to
be the maximum amount that a bank (or other formal lender) would
lend you to purchase seed, fertilizer, and pesticide inputs? MK
___________
ii. What interest rate would you expect the bank (or other formal
lender) to charge for an input loan?

%

11. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to noncontracted tobacco production, would you expect to be able to take out a loan
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from an informal money lender such as relatives, friends or local money lenders
to cover at least part of the input cost? Yes

No

b. If no, proceed to question 12. If yes,
i. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated
to non-contracted tobacco production, what would you expect to
be the maximum amount that an informal money lender would lend
you to purchase seed, fertilizer, and pesticide inputs?

MK

___________
ii. What interest rate would you expect the informal money lender to
charge for an input loan?

%

12. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to noncontracted tobacco production, how much total quantity of tobacco (kgs) would
you expect to produce during the upcoming growing season? ___________ kgs
13. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to noncontracted tobacco production, what is the highest possible quantity of total
tobacco (kgs) that you could reasonably expect to produce during the upcoming
growing season? ___________ kgs
14. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to noncontracted tobacco production, what is the lowest possible quantity of total
tobacco (kgs) that you could reasonably expect to produce during the upcoming
growing season? ___________ kgs
15. For non-contracted tobacco production produced during the upcoming growing
season, what price would you expect to receive? MK _____________
16. For non-contracted tobacco production produced during the upcoming growing
season, what is the highest possible price that you could reasonably expect to
receive? MK _____________
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17. For non-contracted tobacco production produced during the upcoming growing
season, what is the lowest possible price that you could reasonably expect to
receive? MK _____________
18. For non-contracted tobacco production, how likely is it that you would be able
to negotiate for a higher price after receiving an initial auction price?
Very Likely

Somewhat Likely

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

19. For non-contracted production, out of say 100 bales delivered, how many bales
would you expect be rejected at the initial sale attempt in the auction market?
_________ bales
20. For non-contracted production, after delivery to the auction floor, how many
days do you expect it would take for the tobacco to sell? _________ days
21. For non-contracted production, how many trips would you expect to make to
complete the registration process? _________ trips
22. How much you would expect to spend per trip in the registration process (include
cost of transportation, food, etc.)? MK ___________
CONTRACTED TOBACCO PRODUCTION
If the answer to question 5 is zero, skip to question 30? Else, go to question 23.
(Questions for those who are contracting during the upcoming growing season)
23. For the acres allocated to contracted tobacco production for the upcoming
growing season (response to question 5), how much do you expect the tobacco
seed will cost? MK ___________
24. For the acres allocated to contracted tobacco production for the upcoming
growing season (response to question 5), how much do you expect the fertilizers
applied to the tobacco crop will cost? MK ___________
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25. For the acres allocated to contracted tobacco production for the upcoming
growing season (response to question 5), how much do you expect the pesticides
applied to the tobacco crop will cost? MK ___________
26. For the acres allocated to contracted tobacco production for the upcoming
growing season (response to question 5), do you expect to receive a loan to cover
all of the seed, fertilizer, and pesticide costs?
Yes

No

a. If yes, what interest rate do you expect to pay on the input loan?

%

27. For the acres allocated to contracted tobacco production for the upcoming
growing season (response to question 5), how much total quantity of tobacco
(kgs) do you expect to produce during the upcoming growing season?
___________ kgs
28. For the acres allocated to contracted tobacco production for the upcoming
growing season (response to question 5), what is the highest possible quantity
of total tobacco (kgs) that you could reasonably expect to produce during the
upcoming growing season? ___________ kgs
29. For the acres allocated to contracted tobacco production for the upcoming
growing season (response to question 5), what is the lowest possible quantity of
total tobacco (kgs) that you could reasonably expect to produce during the
upcoming growing season? ___________ kgs
(Questions for those who are not contracting for the upcoming growing season)
30. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to contracted
tobacco production, how much would you expect the tobacco seed to cost? MK
___________
31. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to contracted
tobacco production, how much would you expect the fertilizers applied to the
tobacco crop to cost? MK ___________
60

32. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to contracted
tobacco production, how much would you expect the pesticides applied to the
tobacco crop to cost? MK ___________
33. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to contracted
tobacco production, do you expect that you would receive a loan to cover all of
the seed, fertilizer, and pesticide costs?
Yes

No

a. If yes, what interest rate would you expect to pay on the input loan?

%

34. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to contracted
tobacco production, how much total quantity of tobacco (kgs) would you expect
to produce during the upcoming growing season? ___________ kgs
35. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to contracted
tobacco production, what is the highest possible quantity of total tobacco (kgs)
that you could reasonably expect to produce during the upcoming growing
season? ___________ kgs
36. If all of your tobacco acres (response to question 4) were allocated to contracted
tobacco production, what is the lowest possible quantity of total tobacco (kgs)
that you could reasonably expect to produce during the upcoming growing
season? ___________ kgs
(The following questions are for all respondents, regardless of whether or not they
actually intend to contract in the upcoming growing season)
37. For contracted tobacco production produced during the upcoming growing
season, what price would you expect to receive? MK _____________
38. For contracted tobacco production produced during the upcoming growing
season, what is the highest possible price you could reasonably expect to
receive?

MK _____________
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39. For contracted tobacco production produced during the upcoming growing
season, what is the lowest possible price you could reasonably expect to receive?
MK _____________
40. For contracted tobacco production, how likely is it that you would be able to
negotiate for a higher price after receiving an initial price offer?
Very Likely

Somewhat Likely

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

41. For contracted production, out of 100 bales delivered, how many bales would
you expect be rejected at the initial sale? _________ bales
42. For contracted production, after delivery to the auction floor, how many days
do you expect it would take for the tobacco to sell? _________ days
43. For contracted production, how many trips would you expect to make to
complete the registration process? _________ trips
GENERAL
44. How long have you been growing tobacco? __________ years

45. Think about other farmers you know who have experience with tobacco
contracting. How would you describe their experiences?
Very Positive

Positive Neutral

Negative

Very Negative

Or
No knowledge of other farmers’ contracting experiences
46. How would you assess the desirability of the following aspects of contracting?
Availability of input loan

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Negative
Acquisition of technical knowledge
Negative
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Time from delivery to sale

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Negative
Number of selling days
Negative
Rejection rate
Negative
Confidence that you will be paid
Negative
Time to get paid after selling
Negative
Price received by farmer
Negative
Other

_____________________
Negative
_____________________
Negative
_____________________
Negative

47. How can you assess the desirability of the following aspects of non-contracting?
Availability of input loan

Positive

Neutral

Negative
Time from delivery to sale

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Negative
Number of selling days
Negative
Rejection rate
Negative
Confidence that you will be paid
Negative
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Time to get paid after selling

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Positive

Neutral

Negative
Price received by farmer
Negative
Other ___________________
Negative
___________________
Negative
___________________
Negative
48. Gender of household head
Male
Female
49. How old are you? _________ years

50. What is the highest level of education you attained?
Primary school
Junior certificate
MSCE
Tertiary
51. How many members are in your household? __________ members

52. Do you….
Live in iron roofed house?

Yes

No

Have a car?

Yes

No

Have a bicycle?

Yes

No

Yes
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No

Have a television set?

Have a cellphone?

Yes

No

53. What is your approximate annual household income (from all sources)?
MK ____________
54. Considering your response to question 53, how much of this amount comes from
non-agricultural sources? MK ____________
55. Considering your response to question 53, how much of this amount comes from
tobacco sales? MK _____________
Thank you for participating in this questionnaire.
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CHICHEWA VERSION OF QUESTIONNAIRE
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KAFUKUFUKU WOKHUDZA ALIMI A FODYA NDI NKHANI YA
MGWIRIZANO
1. Kodi ndinu amene mumapanga ziganizo zofunikira zokhudzana ndi ulimi wa fodya
pakhomo panu?

Eya

Ayi

a. Ngati ‘Eya’ pitirizani. Ngati ‘Ayi’ lekezani pompa,
2. Kodi ndi malo olimapo wochuluka bwanji (onse pamodzi oti mutha kulimapo mbeu
zonse) amene mukuyembekezera kulimapo mu chaka chino? Ma ekala_____________
3. Kodi mukulingalira zolima fodya chaka chino (sizoni ino)? Eya

Ayi

a. Ngati ‘eya’, pitirizani kufunsa. Ngati ‘ayi’, lekezani pomwepa, pitani kwa
wina
4. Kodi ndi malo wochuluka bwanji (ma ekala angati) amene mukuyembekezera
kulimapo fodya? Ma ekala_____________ (akhale ofanana kapena wochepera kwa
omwe atchula ku funso 1)
5. Kodi ndi ma ekala angati omwe mukuyembekezera kulimapo fodya wa mgwirizano?
________ Acres (akhale ofanana kapena wochepera kwa omwe atchula ku funso 3)
a. Ngati ma ekala ali wosiyana ndi amene atchulidwa mu 3 (kusonyeza kuti
akulingalira kulimako pa mgwirizano), pitirizani kufunsa 6
b. Kodi

munalimapo

fodya

wopanda

mgwirizano

chipandepande/okoshoni) mu zaka za mmbuyomu? Eya
i.

(wogulitsa

ku

Ayi

Ngati ‘ayi’, lekezani pomwepa kufunsa

6. Kodi ndi ma sizoni angati/zaka zingati mmbuyomu (kupatula chaka chino) zomwe
munalimako fodya pa mgwirizano? Ma sizoni __________
a. Kodi munalowako mgwirizano ndi ma kampani angati wosiyana? Ma
kampani________
ZOKHUDZANA NDI KULIMA FODYA OPANDA MGWIRIZANO
7. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 4 mwalimapo fodya opanda
mgwirizano, wogulitsa pa okoshoni, mungayembekezere kuonononga ndalama zingati
pa njere? MK __________
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8. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 4 mwalimapo fodya opanda
mgwirizano, mungayembekezere kuonononga ndalama zingati pa feteleza? MK
_________
9. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 4 mwalimapo fodya opanda
mgwirizano, mungayembekezere kuonononga ndalama zingati pa mankhwala a
tizilombo ndi ena opopera? MK __________
10. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 4 mwalimapo fodya opanda
mgwirizano, mungathe kuyembekezera kuti mutha kutenga ngongole ku banki kapena
ku bungwe la ngongole za ulimi kapena bizinesi, yokuthandizani kugula zina mwa
zipangizo kapena zonse zokhudzana ndi ulimi wanu wa fodya wu? Eya

Ayi

a. Ngati ‘Ayi’ pitani ku funso 11. Ngati ‘Eya’ pitirizani kufunsa
i.

Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 4 mwalimapo
fodya opanda mgwirizano, mungathe kuyembekezera kuti banki
ingathe kukupatsani ndalama zingati zochulukitsitsa, kuti mugulire
zipangizo monga mbeu, feteleza ndi mankhwala? MK ______________

ii.

Kodi mungathe kuyembekezera chiongola dzanja cha bwanji ku banki
chokhudzana ndi ngongoleyi? _____________%

11. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 4 mwalimapo fodya opanda
mgwirizano, mungathe kuyembekezera kuti mutha kutenga ngongole kwa anzanu,
achibale kapena obwereketsa ndalama mmudzi, yokuthandizani kugula zina mwa
zipangizo kapena zonse zokhudzana ndi ulimi wanu wa fodya wu? Eya

Ayi

a. Ngati ‘eya’ pitani ku funso 11. Ngati ‘ayi’ pitirizani kufunsa
i.

Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 3 mwalimapo
fodya

opanda

mgwirizano,

mungathe

kuyembekezera

kuti

obwereketsawa angathe kukupatsani ndalama zingati zochulukitsitsa,
kuti mugulire zipangizo monga mbeu, feteleza ndi mankhwala? MK
_____________
ii.

Kodi mungathe kuyembekezera chiongola dzanja cha bwanji kwa
obwereketsa

ndalama

wa

__________________%
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chokhudzana

ndi

ngongoleyi?

12. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 4 mwalimapo fodya opanda
mgwirizano, ndi fodya wochuluka bwanji amene mungathe kuyembekezera kukolola?
_____________ kgs
13. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 4 mwalimapo fodya opanda
mgwirizano, ndi fodya wambiri bwanji wochulukitsitsa amene mungathe
kuyembekezera kukolola? _______________ kgs
14. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 4 mwalimapo fodya opanda
mgwirizano,

ndi

fodya

wambiri

bwanji

wochepetsetsa

amene

mungathe

kuyembekezera kukolola? _______________ kgs
15. Kodi ndi mtengo wanji womwe mukuyembekezera kupatsidwa ku msika wa
chipandepande mu msika ukudzawu? _____________ USD
16. Kodi ndi mtengo wanji wokulitsitsa womwe mukuyembekezera kupatsidwa ku msika
wa chipandepande mu msika ukudzawu? ________________ USD
17. Kodi ndi mtengo wanji wochepetsetsa womwe mukuyembekezera kupatsidwa ku
msika wa chipandepande mu msika ukudzawu? ________________ USD
18. Kodi mukuganiza kuti padzakhala kuthekera bwanji kukhala ndi mwayi wopempha
mtengo wowonjezera mutapatsidwa kale mtengo ku msika wa chipandepande (wa
okoshoni)?
Zotheka kwambiri

Zotheka pang’ono

Zosatheka

Zosatheka kwambiri

19. Ku msika wa chipandepande (wa okoshoni), kodi pa ma belo 100 aliwonse, ndi ma
belo angati omwe mukuyembekezera kuti angathe kubwelera osagulidwa?
________________
20. Kodi fodya wopanda mgwirizano akatsitsidwa ku okoshoni, ndi masiku angati omwe
angayembekezereke kukhala atagulidwa? Masiku ____________
21. Kodi munayenda kapena mukuyembekezera kuyenda ma ulendo angati kupita
kokhomera chitupa chopanda mgwirizano? Ma ulendo _____________
22. Kodi mukuyembekezera kuononga ndalama zingati pa ulendo umodzi wopita
kukakhomera chitupa? MK ______________
ZOKHUDZANA NDI KULIMA FODYA WA MGWIRIZANO
If the answer to question 5 is zero, skip to question 30? Else, go to question 23.
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(Questions for those who are contracting during the upcoming growing
season)
23. Pa ma ekala omwe mutalimepo fodya wa mgwirizano (funso 5), kodi
mukuyembekezera kuononga ndalama zingati pa mbeu? MK ______________
24. Pa ma ekala omwe mutalimepo fodya wa mgwirizano (funso 5), kodi
mukuyembekezera kuononga ndalama zingati pa feteleza? MK _____________
25. Pa ma ekala omwe mutalimepo fodya wa mgwirizano (funso 5), kodi
mukuyembekezera kuononga ndalama zingati pa mankhwala a tizilombo ndi ena
opopera? MK ___________
26. Pa ma ekala omwe mutalimepo fodya wa mgwirizano (funso 5), kodi
mukuyembekezera kulandira/kutenga ngongole yokwanira kugula mbeu, feteleza ndi
mankhwala a zilombo zokwanira malo mukuyembekezera kulimawa? Eya

Ayi

a. Ngati ‘eya’, kodi mukuyembekezera kudzapereka chiongola dzanja chotani pa
ngongoleyi? _______________%
27. Kodi pa ma ekala amene mutalimepo fodya wa mgwirizano (funso 5),
mukuyembekezera kudzakolola fodya wochuluka bwanji? ________________ kgs
28. Nanga pa ma ekala amene mutalimepo fodya wa mgwirizano (funso 5), kodi ndi
zokolola zanji zochulukitsitsa zomwe mukuyembekezera kuti mungadzathe kukolola
chaka chino? _____________ kgs
29. Nanga pa ma ekala amene mutalimepo fodya wa mgwirizano (funso 5), kodi ndi
zokolola zanji zochepetsetsa zomwe mukuyembekezera kuti mungadzathe kukolola
chaka chino? _____________ kgs
Mafunso okhudza amene sakulima pa mgwirizano chaka chino
30. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 3 mwalimapo fodya wa
mgwirizano, mungayembekezere kuonononga ndalama zingati pa mbeu? MK
______________
31. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 3 mwalimapo fodya wa
mgwirizano, mungayembekezere kuonononga ndalama zingati pa feteleza? MK
_______________
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32. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 3 mwalimapo fodya wa
mgwirizano, mungayembekezere kuonononga ndalama zingati pa mankhwala a
tizilombo ndi ena opopera? MK _______________
33. Mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 3 mwalimapo fodya wa mgwirizano,
kodi mungathe kuyembekezera kulandira ngongole yokwanira kugula mbeu, feteleza
ndi mankhwala a zilombo zokwanira malo mukuyembekezera kulimawa? Eya

Ayi

a. Ngati ‘Eya’, kodi mungathe kuyembekezera kudzapereka chiongola dzanja
chotani pa ngongoleyi? _____________%

Don’t know

34. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 3 mwalimapo fodya wa
mgwirizano, mungathe kuyembekezera kukolola fodya wochuluka bwanji?
_______________ kgs
35. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 3 mwalimapo fodya wa
mgwirizano,

kodi

ndi

zokolola

zanji

zochulukitsitsa

zomwe

mungathe

kuyembekezera kuti mungathe kukolola? _____________ kgs
36. Kodi mutakhala kuti pa ma ekala mwatchula mu funso 3 mwalimapo fodya wa
mgwirizano, kodi ndi zokolola zanji zochepetsetsa zomwe mungathe kuyembekezera
kuti mungathe kukolola? _______________ kgs
Mafunso otsatirawa ndi a wina aliyense (wolima pa mgwirizano komanso
wolima opanda mgwirizano)
37. Kodi mukuyembekezera mtengo wanji ku msika wa mgwirizano? ___________ USD
38. Kodi ndi mtengo wanji wokulitsitsa womwe mukuyembekezera ku msika wa
mgwirizano? ____________ USD
39. Kodi ndi mtengo wanji wochepetsetsa womwe mukuyembekezera kupatsidwa ku
msika wa mgwirizano mu msika ukudzawu? _____________ USD
40. Kodi mukuganiza kuti ndizotheka bwanji (kwambiri zedi, kwambiri, osati kwenikweni,
zosatheka) kudzatha kupempha mtengo wowonjezera mutapatsidwa kale mtengo ku
msika wa mgwirizano?
Kwabiri zedi

kwambiri

kwambiri
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zokaikitsa

zokaikitsa

41. Pa ma belo 100 aliwonse (mzere umodzi) ku msika wa mgwirizano, kodi ndi ma belo
angati omwe mukuyembekezera kuti angadzathe kubwelera osagulidwa? Ma belo
____________
42. Kodi fodya wa mgwirizano akatsitsitsidwa ku okoshoni, ndi masiku angati omwe
mungayembekezere kuti fodyayu akhala atagulidwa? Masiku ____________
43. Kodi munayenda kapena mukuyembekezera kuyenda ma ulendo angati kupita
kokhomera chitupa cha mgwirizano? Ma ulendo ___________

Mafunso Ena
44. Kodi mwakhala mukulima fodya kwa zaka zingati? Zaka __________________
45. Kodi zomwe anakumana nazo anzamu kapena alimi ena amene analowako mu
mgwirizano mungazilongosole motani pa mlingo wochoka ku zabwino kwambiri
mpaka zosakhala bwino?
Zabwino zedi

zabwinoko

pakatin’pakati

zoipa

zoipa zedi
Kapena
Sindikudziwa zomwe anakumana nazo ena pa nkhani yokhudza ulimi wa
mgwirizano
46. Kodi nkhani zokhudzana ndi ulimi wa fodya pa mgwirizano zotsatirazi mungazilinge
bwanji pa kufunika kwake ku mbali yanu? ( “ZF” kuimira Zofunikira; “NB” kuimira
Ndilibe Mbali; “ZS” kuimira Zosafunikira)
Kupezeka

kwa

ngongole

ZF

NB

ZS
Kudziwa/kuphunzirako

zina

zatsopano

ZF
ZS
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NB

Nthawi

kuchoka

potsitsa

kukgulitsa

mpaka
ZF

NB

ZS
Kuchuluka

kwa

masiku

ogulitsira

ZF

NB

ZS
Fodya

kubwelera/kusagulidwa

msika

pa
ZF

NB

ZS
Zokhudzana

ndi

kupempha

mtengo

msika

wowonjezera
ZF

ku
NB

ZS
Chikhulupiliro

choti

mulipidwa

ndalama
ZF

mukagulitsa

zanu
NB

ZS
Kutalika

kwa

nthawi

kuti

mukagulitsa

ndalama
ZF

zikufikeni
NB

ZS
Zina ___________________________________________
_________________________________________
_________________________________________
_________________________________________
47. Kodi nkhani zokhudzana ndi ulimi wa fodya wopanda mgwirizano zotsatirazi
mungazilinge bwanji pa kufunika kwake kwa inuyo?
Kupezeka kwa ngongole

ZF

NB

Nthawi kuchoka potsitsa mpaka kukgulitsa

ZF

NB

Kuchuluka kwa masiku ogulitsira

ZF

NB

ZS
ZS
ZS
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Fodya kubwelera/kusagulidwa pa msika

ZF

NB

ZS
Zokhudzana ndi kupempha mtengo wowonjezera ku msika ZF
NB

ZS

Chikhulupiliro choti mulipidwa ndalama zanu mukagulitsa ZF
NB

ZS

Kutalika kwa nthawi kuti ndalama zikufikeni mukagulitsa ZF
NB

ZS

Zina ___________________________________________
_________________________________________
_________________________________________
48. Kodi mutu wa banja ndi wammuna kapena wamkazi?
Wammuna

Wamkazi

49. Muli ndi zaka zingati? ______________
50. Kodi sukulu munafika nayo patali bwanji?
Pulayimale
JC
MSCE
Kupitilira sekondale
51. Kodi pakhomo lanu mulipo anthu angati? _______________
52. Kodi muli ndi:
Nyumba ya malata?

Eya

Ayi

Galimoto?

Eya

Ayi

Njinga ya moto

Eya

Ayi

Njinga ya kapalasa? Eya

Ayi

TV?

Eya

Ayi

Foni ya mmanja?

Eya

Ayi

53. Kodi mumatha kupeza ndalama zingati pa chaka kuchoka ku chilichonse chomwe
chimakubweretserani ndalama? MK ________________
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54. Pa ndalama mwatchula mmwambamu (funso 52), ndi zingati zomwe zimachokera ku
ntchito zina zosakhudzana ndi ulimi? MK ____________
55. Pa ndalama mwatchula mmwambamu (funso 52), ndi ndalama zingati zomwe
zimachokera ku ulimi wanu wa fodya? MK _____________
Zikomo kwambiri potenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu
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IRB APPROVAL
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Protocol Title: Factors Influencing Malawian Tobacco Farmers' Decisions Regarding
Contracting
Protocol Number: 14-287
Principal Investigator: Mr. Penjani Singini
Date of Determination: 9/26/2014
Qualifying Exempt Category: 45 CFR 46.101(b) (2)
Attachments: 14-287 - Approved Informed Consent (in follow-up e-mail)
Dear Mr. Singini:
The Human Research Protection Program has determined the above referenced project
exempt from IRB review.
Please note the following:
 Retain a copy of this correspondence for your records.


An approval stamp is required on all informed consents. You must use the
wording from the stamped consent form for obtaining consent from participants.



Only the MSU staff and students named on the application are approved as MSU
investigators and/or key personnel for this study.



You do not need to submit an application for annual continuing review; however,
a new application must be submitted if the study is ongoing after 5 years from the
date of approval. (SOP 01-03 Administrative Review of Applications)



Any modifications to the project must be reviewed and approved by the HRPP
prior to implementation. Any failure to adhere to the approved protocol could
result in suspension or termination of your project.



Per university requirement, all research-related records (e.g. application materials,
letters of support, signed consent forms, etc.) must be retained and available for
audit for a period of at least 3 years after the research has ended.



It is the responsibility of the investigator to promptly report events that may
represent unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others.

This determination is issued under the Mississippi State University's OHRP Federalwide
Assurance #FWA00000203. All forms and procedures can be found on the HRPP
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website: www.orc.msstate.edu.
Thank you for your cooperation and good luck to you in conducting this research project.
If you have questions or concerns, please contact me atkmyhand@orc.msstate.edu or
call 662-325-3294.
Finally, we would greatly appreciate your feedback on the HRPP approval process.
Please take a few minutes to complete our survey
at https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/YZC7QQD.
Sincerely,
Katie Myhand
Assistant Compliance Administrator
cc: Barry Barnett (Advisor)
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IRB APPROVED CONSENT FORM
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Page 1 of 2 Version: 08/15/2014
Mississippi State University
Informed Consent Form for Participation in Research
Title of Research Study: Factors Influencing Malawian Tobacco Farmers’ Decisions
Regarding Contracting
Study Site: Lilongwe, Kasungu, and Dowa Districts, Malawi
Researchers: Penjani Singini, M.S. student; Barry J. Barnett, Professor; Ardian Harri,
Assoc. Professor; Kalyn Coatney, Asst. Professor; Jesse Tack, Asst. Professor; Yohane
Chimbalanga, Enumerator; Chimwemwe Khoswe, Enumerator; Tabitha Nindi,
Enumerator
Purpose
The purpose of this research is to better understand factors that influence the contracting
decisions of smallholder tobacco farmers in Malawi.
Procedures
If you agree to participate in this study you will be interviewed by the researcher who
will ask several questions about producing and selling tobacco. The questions will be
read to you by the researcher from a prepared questionnaire. The interview may take up
to 40 minutes to complete.
Benefits
The Government of Malawi has not been involved in developing this research project or
in selecting the questions that will be asked. However, the overall findings from this
research will be shared with the Government of Malawi and may help the Government
develop policies that further encourage smallholder tobacco production.
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Incentive to participate
You will not be paid for participating in this study.
Confidentiality
Your name will not be recorded with your responses. Our records will only indicate that
you are a tobacco farmer who was interviewed at this location.
Please note that these records will be held by a state entity and, therefore, are subject to
disclosure if required by law. Research information may be shared with the MSU
Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the Office for Human Research Protections
(OHRP).
The sponsor of this study USAID may also have access to the records of the research.
Approved:

Expires:

*3#

09/26/14 09/26/19 14-287
Page 2 of 2 Version: 08/15/2014
Questions
If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact Penjani
Singini at 0999 609 647 or Dr. Barry Barnett at barnett@agecon.msstate.edu.
Voluntary Participation
Please understand that your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate will
involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may
discontinue your participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits.
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Please take all the time you need to read through this document and decide whether you
would like to participate in this research study.
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign below. You will be given a
copy of this form for your records.
________________________________ __________
Participant Signature

Date

________________________________ __________
Investigator Signature
Approved:

Date

Expires:

*3#

09/26/14 09/26/19 14-287
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